Why Many Syrians May Accept Normalizing Relations with Russia but Reject any Level of Relation with Iran

(An AI translation of the Arabic version)

In recent debates about Syria’s future foreign relations, an apparent paradox often emerges. Many Syrians appear willing—at least politically, and sometimes even publicly—to contemplate normalizing relations with Russia, despite the devastating consequences of Russia’s military intervention against Syrian aspirations for freedom. Yet the same Syrians strongly reject any prospect of reconciliation or renewed engagement with Iran.

At first glance, this position may appear contradictory. Both Russia and Iran intervened decisively in support of the Assad regime, and both played roles in the immense human and material devastation Syria has endured over the past decade. However, understanding Syrian attitudes requires moving beyond superficial comparisons and examining the deeper differences between the two interventions: their motivations, methods, and long-term implications.

A closer analysis reveals that, for many Syrians, the distinction lies not merely in the scale of violence but in the nature of each actor’s project in Syria and the region.

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1. The Nature of Influence: State Power vs. Proxy Networks

Russia’s intervention in Syria, however destructive, largely fits within the familiar framework of great-power geopolitics. Moscow’s objectives were consistent with traditional strategic calculations: preserving influence in the Middle East, protecting a longstanding ally, and securing military access to the Mediterranean through its naval and air bases.

Such actions reflect what international relations scholars describe as conventional state power projection. Major powers have historically sought influence abroad through military bases, formal agreements, and direct relations with recognized governments. While these arrangements can impose significant constraints on smaller states, they remain grounded in the logic of interstate relations and can theoretically be renegotiated as political circumstances change.

Iran’s approach has followed a markedly different model. Tehran has pursued a strategy rooted in the doctrine often described as “exporting the revolution,” which relies heavily on building networks of ideologically aligned non-state actors. Rather than depending primarily on traditional military presence, Iran has cultivated militias and armed movements that operate under its ideological framework, particularly the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Jurist).

Across Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, these groups have evolved into powerful actors embedded within local political and security structures. This form of proxy warfare allows Iran to project influence indirectly while maintaining a degree of strategic ambiguity.

The structural implications of this approach are significant. Military bases can theoretically be closed, and foreign troops can eventually withdraw. Proxy networks, however, often become deeply intertwined with domestic institutions, economic systems, and social hierarchies. Once embedded, they are far more difficult to dismantle—especially in states already weakened by conflict.

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2. Identity, Society, and Demographic Concerns

Another key distinction frequently cited by Syrians concerns the perceived impact of each intervention on the country’s social fabric.

Russia’s role in Syria has been primarily military and strategic. While its actions have caused immense destruction, Moscow has not pursued a systematic effort to reshape Syrian identity, religious affiliation, or sectarian balance.

Iran’s regional strategy, by contrast, has often been accompanied by efforts that critics describe as societal and cultural penetration. In Syria and elsewhere, analysts and researchers have pointed to patterns suggesting attempts to cultivate long-term ideological and demographic influence.

These patterns include the establishment of religious institutions aligned with Iranian clerical authority, outreach initiatives promoting Twelver Shiism, financial support for individuals and families who align themselves with these networks, and property acquisitions in strategically important areas. In some cases, settlement patterns involving militia members and their families have further fueled concerns about demographic transformation.

Reports and policy analyses examining population changes in Syria since 2011 have repeatedly raised questions about these developments. Similar debates have also appeared in Lebanon, particularly regarding the controversial naturalization decree of 1994 during Syria’s period of dominance there, which granted citizenship to hundreds of thousands of individuals and reshaped certain demographic balances.

Within Syria itself, the issue of property rights has become especially sensitive. Legal measures such as Law No. 10, introduced by the former regime, enabled large-scale expropriation of property belonging to displaced Syrians. For many observers, such policies compounded fears that wartime displacement could produce lasting demographic consequences.

As a result, many Syrians perceive Iranian influence not merely as a geopolitical presence but as a force capable of altering the country’s social and demographic structure in ways that could prove extremely difficult to reverse.

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3. International Frameworks vs. Regional Power Struggles

Another distinction often cited relates to the broader political context in which each intervention occurred.

Russia justified its involvement in Syria as part of internationally mediated diplomatic efforts and political negotiations aimed at managing the conflict. Initiatives such as de-escalation zones and diplomatic frameworks involving international actors were presented as mechanisms for stabilizing the battlefield and advancing political dialogue.

Many Syrians view these arrangements as deeply flawed and often detrimental to their interests. Nevertheless, they were embedded within an identifiable diplomatic process involving major powers and international institutions.

Iran’s involvement, by contrast, has frequently been perceived as operating outside such frameworks. Its networks of militias and allied groups transformed parts of Syria into arenas for broader regional rivalries. Confrontations involving Israel, Iran-aligned forces, and other actors increasingly played out on Syrian territory.

In this environment, Syrians often found themselves bearing the consequences of geopolitical confrontations that extended far beyond their own national struggle.

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4. Partnership vs. Structural Dependency

For many Syrians, the final distinction lies in how each relationship might evolve in the future.

Relations with Russia, however unequal, still resemble a state-to-state relationship governed by diplomacy, agreements, and mutual interests. In theory, such relationships can be renegotiated as political realities shift and as Syria attempts to reassert sovereignty over its territory and institutions.

Iranian influence, however, is widely perceived as operating through transnational ideological networks rather than traditional diplomatic channels. Because these networks are embedded within armed groups, political factions, and economic structures, disengaging from them could prove far more complicated.

This distinction—between a geopolitical relationship and a deeply embedded ideological project—helps explain why many Syrians view the two cases differently.

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Conclusion

Syrians understand that politics is ultimately shaped by pragmatic calculations. Yet they also distinguish between different kinds of external influence.

One may deal pragmatically with a powerful state pursuing strategic interests, even after a painful conflict. That relationship, however difficult, still operates within the recognizable framework of international politics.

An ideological project that embeds itself within societies, reshapes local institutions, and builds armed networks that operate beyond the authority of the state represents a fundamentally different challenge.

For many Syrians, this distinction explains why engagement with Russia may be viewed as a difficult but conceivable political reality, while reconciliation with Iran remains far more contentious. After years of conflict and upheaval, Syrians are wary of repeating experiences that have already proven deeply destructive.

As the familiar proverb suggests: Only a fool repeats a failed experiment; for a true believer is never stung from the same hole twice.